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Abstract  
In this thesis factors affecting bank lending in the United States are sought for. For this purpose 
variables that can be derived from prevailing theories and previous research are used. These 
include for example the interest rate, the nonperforming loans ratio and the capital to asset ratio. 
The data series cover the time period 1988Q1-2009Q3. Regression models in a-general-to-
specific framework together with other econometric methods are applied to attain the results. 
The nonperforming loans ratio followed by the interest rate, excess reserves to total reserves and 
house prices are found to be the most important variables in explaining bank lending. Another 
finding is that banks allocate more loans to loan categories that are less risky than the average 
bank loan.  
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1 Introduction  
“credit crunch.   A period where lenders are unwilling to extend or renew advances to existing or potential 
borrowers. Such conditions increase the likelihood of default by borrowers since they may find it impossible to obtain 
new funds”1 
In 2008 Wall Street and the American economy experienced the biggest crisis since the Great 
Depression. In September 2008 the investment bank Lehman Brothers went bankrupt and 
financial turmoil and worries spread. The Financial crisis resulted in $700 billion bailout of the 
financial industry in October 2008 and a $787 billion stimulus measure in February 2009 adopted 
by the federal government.2 The Federal Reserve, whose chairman Ben Bernanke has published 
academic research related to the Great Depression, bank lending and the credit view, took 
extreme measures in defeating the recession. These measures included dropping the interest rate 
to zero, lending funds to investors and companies, buying up treasury bonds and purchasing 
unwanted or troubled assets.3 As Bernanke urged for a swift passage of the $700 billion rescue of 
the financial sector in order to restore credit to households and businesses it is obvious that the 
Federal Reserve believes that bank credit plays an important role in the business cycle. The 
central bank’s extreme actions also prove that dropping the interest rate alone was not sufficient 
to fight the recession and the “credit crunch”.4  
Bernanke (1983) concludes that the depth and the length of the Great Depression cannot be fully 
explained by a decrease in money or money supply as Monetarists, especially Milton Friedman 
and Anna Schwartz, accentuated. However, Bernanke has showed that an augmentation of the 
Monetarists’ model with bank loans and proxies of the financial crisis improves the explanatory 
power of the depth and the length of the depression.5 A study by Lown and Morgan (2006) 
indicates that a tightening of bank lending standards leads to lower output and lower supply of 
bank loans. In the paper it is argued that every recession in the United States between 1967 and 
2000 except for one has been preceded by tightening standards. Credit standards are also found 
                                                 
1
 http://www.oxfordreference.com.ludwig.lub.lu.se/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t181.e1820, 
Accessed 2010-01-12 
2
 http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_crisis/index.html, Accessed 2009-10-
28 
3
 http://money.cnn.com/2009/10/08/news/economy/bernanke_fed_balance_sheet/index.htm, Accessed 
2009-11-15 
4
 http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601170&sid=anu37z.PbcLA, Accessed 2009-11-12 
5
 Bernanke B. (1983), pp. 257-276 
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to be more informative about future lending than are loan rates.6 In an IMF working paper 
Bayoumi and Melander (2008) confirm that credit and credit standards are linked to the macro 
economy.7 Kashyap, Lamont, Stein (1994) conclude that financial factors influence inventory 
movements. They also point out that financial constraints are much more binding during tight 
money or recessionary periods.8 Apart from the studies just mentioned, there are many other 
papers that confirm a linkage between credit and the economy.  
If credit or money influence macroeconomic performance, why are these not used to guide 
monetary policy? Monetary targeting, i.e. targeting the growth rate of money supply measures 
such as M1 and M2, has been used by many central banks around the world, for example the 
Federal Reserve in the USA. However, the relationship between money, price level, velocity of 
money and output stated in the quantity equation broke down which led to a formal 
abandonment of monetary targeting in 1987. The breakdown of the quantity equation came to be 
known as the “velocity decline” as it appeared as if the velocity of money declined in the 
equation. Economists could not explain where the money went. This episode was named “the 
case of the missing money” by the Princeton economist Stephen Goldfeld. Instead of monetary 
aggregates more attention has been paid to inflation by central banks since then.9 Some authors 
have found the credit-output relationship more stable than money-output. Bernanke and Blinder 
(1988) report that the credit-demand function is more stable over time than the money-demand 
function, at least since 1979.10 B. Friedman (1983) concludes that the information about 
subsequent movements in nonfinancial activity contained in total net credit is at least comparable 
to that contained in the M1 money supply measure. In other words, total net credit is at least as 
good an indicator of economic activity as money supply.11  The velocity decline could according 
to some authors, Palley(1995), Pollin and Schaberg (1998), Field (1984) and Furey (1993), have 
occurred because of an increase of non-GDP transactions in the money supply. Put differently, 
financial and real estate transactions are not included in GDP so if these non-GDP transactions 
increase or decrease as a share of money, or credit, the relationship between money and output 
will not hold. Werner (2005) has estimated net credit used for GDP transactions, which resulted 
in a stable quantity equation for Japan. He also claims that the long recession in Japan in the 
                                                 
6
 Lown C. and Morgan D. (2006), pp. 1-23  
7
 Bayoumi T. and Melander O. (2008), pp. 1-27  
8
 Kashyap K., Lamont O. and Stein J. (1994), pp. 565-592 
9
 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20061110a.htm, Accessed 2009-11-23 
10
 Bernanke B. and Blinder A. (1988), pp. 435-439 
11
 Friedman B. (1983), pp. 117-148  
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1990’s was a mistake of the BOJ (bank of Japan), which failed to make Japanese banks extend 
credit.12  
There is a growing interest in the treatment of bank assets (credit) in macroeconomic analysis. 
The proponents of the so called “credit view” criticize Keynesian, Monetarist and Classical 
approaches for their one-sided attention, if any, to bank deposits or money supply. Money, unlike 
credit, is by the adherents of the credit view believed to underestimate binding constraints of real 
activity and thereby also economic fluctuations. Some of the most notable authors of the credit 
view are Bernanke, Blinder, B. Friedman and Stiglitz. Although this approach is rather new, 
credit-based economic theories can be traced back to Wicksell and Schumpeter. There are 
different perspectives of the credit view. One of them is credit rationing. In this view markets do 
not clear because of asymmetric information about risks and returns. As a result of this banks 
ration credit.13  
 
1.1 Formulation of problem  
As we now have seen there are many interesting articles and papers that link credit and output. 
Credit is therefore an important building block of the business cycle, at least in the credit view. It 
is therefore interesting to investigate why credit fluctuates or, in other words, what determines 
bank lending. This is re-formulated into the scientific question of this thesis:  
 Which factors determine bank lending?  
 
1.2 Purpose and delimitation  
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate which factors determine bank lending. The target 
group of the study is students of economics, the banking sector, financial regulators or anyone 
interested in finance and macroeconomics. The thesis is delimited to bank lending in the USA 
during the period 1988Q1-2009Q3.  
                                                 
12
 Werner R. (2005), pp. 1-341 
13
 Trautwein H-M. (2000), pp. 155-183  
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2 Prior research 
One of the most influential papers of the credit view is the work by Bernanke and Blinder (1988) 
which presents the IS-LM model augmented with bank loans and bonds. The IS-LM model is 
developed through a model for bank lending constraints when only loans and bonds are 
considered. Finally money and credit demand are estimated, in which the bank prime rate and the 
three month Treasury bill rate are significant.14  
In a report by the RBI (Reserve Bank of India) the determinants of bank credit during the period 
1996-2006 are modeled econometrically. As a structural break appears to have occurred in the 
beginning of 2003, the data is divided into two sub periods which are modeled separately. The 
empirical results indicate that the interest rate, lendable resources and the level of NPAs 
(nonperforming assets) have been the major forces behind bank credit in the first sub period. In 
the second sub period lendable resources, the level of NPAs and asset prices defined as the index 
of house rentals were significant. The conclusion is that the effect of interest rates on credit 
demand was overshadowed by increasing wealth during the second sub period. Bank credit also 
tends to grow pro-cyclically as the output gap (GDP de-trended by the HP-filter) has a significant 
positive coefficient for both sub periods.15  
Barajas, Luna and Restrepo (2008) have carried out a study in which they analyze bank behavior 
and banks’ reactions to macroeconomic shocks in Chile 1989-2006. In order to find out whether 
certain macroeconomic factors and banking variables (de-trended by a HP-filter) lead or lag the 
business cycle, Granger causality tests are performed. In addition to that, a VAR model (Vector 
Autoregressive Model) is used to estimate impulse response functions to compute elasticities. 
The conclusion is that bank loans are pro-cyclical and generally lag the GDP cycle. However, 
demand deposits and the nonperforming loan ratio of consumer loans from local and retail banks 
were found to lead the cycle. Nonperforming loans exhibit countercyclical movements whereas 
demand deposits are pro-cyclical. The CAR (capital adequacy ratio), banks’ liquid assets and 
financial investments are countercyclical. This shows that banks may restrict the supply of loans 
and maintain financial investments during a recession.16  
                                                 
14 
Bernanke B. and Blinder A. (1988), pp. 435-439
 
15 
Reserve Bank of India (2007), pp. 148-149  
16 Barajas A., Luna L. and Restrepo J.E. (2008), pp. 21-56  
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In a paper by Wu, Chang and Selvili (2003) the link between nonperforming loans, real estate 
prices and the banking sector in Taiwan is examined. To obtain the results Granger causality tests 
are applied in both a VAR (Vector Autoregressive Model) and a VEC (Vector Autoregressive 
Error correction Model) framework. Finally, structural and reduced form regressions are 
estimated. Wu, Chang and Selvili conclude that increasing levels of nonperforming loans can be 
caused by risky lending behavior of banks. High levels of nonperforming loans can in turn make 
banks adopt more restrictive real estate lending policies, which cause a slump in the real estate 
market. Hence, the findings of the paper suggest that reducing the nonperforming loan ratio has 
a positive influence on the real estate sector and the banking system. 17  
Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano (2006) investigate bank regulation and macroeconomic 
fluctuations. Through simulations of CAR (Capital Adequacy Ratio), by three different 
approaches (Standardized, IRB and ICRM), they conclude that Basel II is pro-cyclical and could 
lead to banks reducing credit during recessions and increasing credit in good times. The reason 
for this is that the CAR (Capital Adequacy Ratio), especially when measured by the IRB 
approach, is countercyclical and may encourage banks to shift its credit portfolio to higher-quality 
or higher rated credits during recessions. This could exacerbate capital fluctuations. The authors 
point out that the Basel I framework reinforced the 1991/1992 recession in the USA. Rolling 
regressions show that rising property prices significantly increase bank lending for seven out of 
ten countries in the study after financial liberalizations. It is argued that financial liberalization 
relaxes the borrowing constraints of the private sector. A positive productivity shock leads to an 
increase in the value of collateralizable assets such as property. This gives rise to higher lending, 
which in turn fuels economic activity and lending, which increases borrowing capacity through 
collateralized asset prices and so on. This boom leads to a bust when eventually all variables 
converge back to their steady-state levels.18  
Another study by Kashyap and Stein (2004) confirms the pro-cyclicality of Basel II. The capital 
requirements are estimated by the KMV credit rating approach and S&P credit ratings. It is 
shown that KMV is more pro-cyclical than the S&P ratings. A suggestion by the authors is the 
use of business cycle indicators to determine capital requirements. For example, whenever the 
GDP growth falls below a chosen threshold one might drop the CAR from 8 to 6 percent.   
                                                 
17
 Wu W-C., Chang C-O. and Selvili Z. (2003), pp. 43-62  
18
 Goodhart C., Hofmann B. and Segoviano M. (2006), pp. 3-37  
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BIS (Bank for International Settlements) has published a study by Mohanty, Schnabel and 
Garcia-Luna (2006), in which the causes of bank lending fluctuations in emerging economies are 
sought for. A panel data regression encompassing several countries is used for this purpose. The 
empirical evidence shows that both demand and supply factor contribute to the growth rate of 
private sector credit. Bank lending is pro-cyclical as it correlates with the output gap. It is also 
highly sensitive to the NPL (Nonperforming loans) ratio.  Other major findings are that the 
deposit base has a major impact on lending and that a higher interest rate tends to reduce bank 
credit.19  
  
                                                 
19 Mohanty M.S., Schnabel G. and Garcia-Luna P. (2006), pp. 11-39  
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3 Theory 
Money, or money supply, is determined by the interest rate when the central bank uses interest 
rate targeting, according to many macroeconomic textbooks. This can be derived from the 
demand for money, which is assumed to be a function of for example the interest rate and 
income. This is displayed in diagram 3.1 below.  
Diagram 3.1  Money demand and supply 
 
Source: Burda and Wyplosz (2005) 
Although the model describes money supply there are good reasons to use it for bank credit as 
well as money expands when new bank loans are created by banks. In many studies, e.g. RBI 
(2007), Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and Mohanty, Schnabel and Garcia-Luna (2006), it has been 
demonstrated that bank lending is sensitive to interest rates. The interest rate is perhaps best 
described as a variable that affects the demand for money or credit.20 On the other hand, Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981) develop a model of credit rationing which shows that bank loans are interest 
rate inelastic. Monetary policy influences the level of investment through loanable funds rather 
than through interest rates.21  
Except from the interest rate, the demand for money is often also defined as a function of 
income, GDP. Barajas, Luna and Restrepo (2008) found that GDP is slightly more likely to cause 
bank loans than the other way around although this causation can certainly be disputed. It is also 
possible that GDP affects the general risk level of bank loans which in turn would make banks 
                                                 
20 Burda M. och Wyplosz C. (2005), pp. 174-226 
21 Stiglitz J. and Weiss A. (1981), pp. 393-410 
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more (less) risk averse and thereby less (more) willing to lend. However, in this study GDP will 
be considered mostly as a demand variable as risks are believed to be captured by other variables 
described in this chapter.22  
Another variable that is often argued to influence the level of new bank loans, or money creation, 
is the reserve ratio requirement. Bank reserves are vault cash and reserves at the central bank and 
the reserve ratio is the proportion of reserves to deposits. The reserve ratio requirement in the 
USA for depositary institutions is 10 percent on transaction accounts more than $43,9 million. 
However, there are no requirements for time deposits.23 Some countries (eg. Canada, the UK, 
Sweden and Switzerland) do not have any reserve requirements and it is therefore up to banks to 
make prudent decisions on this. Banks must have enough currency for to meet everyday 
withdrawals by customers. This is a good reason to have vault cash or reserves at the central 
bank, which can be converted into cash immediately. Sometimes bank hold excess reserves, i.e. 
reserves in excess of the reserve ratio requirements.24 Although it is often believed that the 
reserve ratio requirements constrain bank deposits the Federal Reserve claims that requirements 
place little constraint on the expansion of deposits as the Federal Reserve accommodates such 
expansions through open market operations.25 This view is also shared by Goodhart (1989).26 As 
the reserve ratio requirement is described as a factor that limits bank loans it has to be viewed as 
a variable that influences the supply of credit.  
Bliss and Kaufman (2002) develop a model for constraints of bank credit expansion. They argue 
that banks do not only have a reserve requirement constraint but also a capital requirement 
constraint. Although the Federal Reserve supplies a bank with reserves it may be unable to 
expand the supply of loans if the capital constraint is reached. The regulatory frameworks Basel I 
(introduced in 1988 in the USA) and Basel II make banks subject to capital requirements 
measured as Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR). CAR is a ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets. 
Capital consists of for example common stock and retained earnings, whereas risk-weighted 
assets is a measure of bank assets given different weights for their perceived risk level. Basel II is 
an augmentation of Basel I where for example operational and market risks have been added to 
the risk-weighted assets. In addition to that, loans, or assets, of the same classification can now be 
                                                 
22
 Burda M. och Wyplosz C. (2005), pp. 174-226 
23
 http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/supplement/2008/02/table1_15.htm, Accessed 2009-12-17 
24
 Burda M. och Wyplosz C. (2005), pp. 174-226 
25
 Feinman J. (1993), pp. 569-589  
26 Goodhart C. (1989), pp. 29-34  
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individually risk-weighted by different approaches, such as the IRB (internal rating-based) and the 
standardized method. Basel II has been criticized by several authors, as discussed earlier, for 
being pro-cyclical and Basel I has been pointed out as a factor that caused the credit crunch in 
the USA 1990-1991 by for example Bernanke and Lown (1991) and Berger and Udell (1994). 
Basel I and Basel II are very complex and will therefore not be explained more in detail in this 
thesis. However, banks are not only constrained by capital requirements by regulators. Often 
banks have self-imposed minimum levels for capital, typically scaled by their riskiness, for 
internal risk-management purposes. Bliss and Kaufman point out that capital constraint are more 
likely to be binding during a recession than an expansion. Monetary policy in recessions, defined 
by dropping the interest rate and supplying the banking system with more reserves, will therefore 
be less efficient, making monetary policy asymmetrical. Instead of using the ratio of capital to 
risk-weighted assets, the capital-asset ratio can be used. This has been examined by e.g. Lown and 
Morgan (2006) and can be interpreted as ratio set by the bank for internal purposes. Internal or 
external capital requirements will be regarded as variables that affect the supply of bank loans.27  
Many authors (e.g. RBI (2007), Barajas, Luna and Restrepo (2008), Wu, Chang and Selvili (2003), 
Mohanty, Schnabel and Garcia-Luna (2006) etc) have found that bank credit depends negatively 
on the ratio of nonperforming loans. A nonperforming loan is a loan on which the borrower is 
not making any interest payment or loan repayments. Local regulation determines at what point a 
loan is classified as a nonperforming loan. In order to cover potential losses banks normally set 
aside money. Banks are profit-maximizing units and a rising level of nonperforming loans will 
reduce earnings. Therefore it may be optimal for banks to decrease the supply of new loans or at 
least tighten credit standards so that potential losses are minimized. This makes nonperforming 
loans a supply variable.28  
Asset prices are found to have a positive influence on bank lending in studies carried out by 
Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano (2006) and RBI (2007). Goodhart et al argue that financial 
deregulation gives rise to boom-bust cycles. Collateralized lending plays an important part in this. 
Positive productivity shocks result in higher asset prices whereas higher asset prices lead to more 
collateralized lending. In turn, more collateralized lending leads to higher asset pricing and so on. 
Before the financial regulation credit controls were a constraint to private sector lending. Thereby 
                                                 
27
 Bliss R. and Kaufman G. (2002), pp. 1-15 and 
Saunders A.and Allen L. (2002), pp. 23-45  
28
 http://lexicon.ft.com/term.asp?t=non_performing-loan--NPL, Accessed 2009-12-12 
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asset prices and financial regulation will be regarded as supply variables. In spite of this, it can 
certainly be argued that asset prices also determine the demand for new bank loans. 29  
Return on equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA) are variables that are sometimes used to 
describe the lending behavior of banks. Barajas, Luna and Restrepo (2008) study the cyclical 
fluctuations of these variables in comparison to bank lending. ROA generally refers to net 
income divided by total assets and ROE is net income to shareholder’s equity. These are both 
indicators of profitability of companies. ROA and ROE are variables that are used to describe the 
supply of bank loans in this study.30   
                                                 
29
 Goodhart C., Hofmann B. and Segoviano M. (2006), pp. 3-37 
30
 Barajas A., Luna L. and Restrepo J.E. (2008), pp. 21-56 
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4 Data description  
The data series used in this study cover the period 1988Q1 – 2009Q3 for which quarterly 
periodicity has been applied. The reason why this time frame has been chosen is due to the fact 
that two of the series, NPLTOTLOANS and CAPASSET, are only available since 1988. The 
variables are denominated in nominal terms and most of them are not seasonally adjusted in 
order to fully capture seasonality. However, in the case of GDPNOM, only seasonally adjusted 
data was available from Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and this has therefore been used. 
The descriptions of the variables below state which fransformations (e.g. differentiation and HP-
filtering) that have been applied in accordance with the stationarity analysis in chapter 6.  
 
AVPRICEHOUSES  
This variable denotes the quarterly growth rate of the average sales price of new houses sold in 
the USA. The series is not seasonally adjusted and therefore exhibits strong seasonality. It is 
provided by the United States Census Bureau that is responsible mainly for census, national 
demographic and economic data. The variable is meant to capture the effect of asset prices on 
bank loans.31  
 
CAPASSET 
CAPASSET is the ratio of total bank equity to total bank assets de-trended by the Hodrick-
Prescott filter in order to obtain the cyclical fluctuations as the ratio is not stable over time. This 
is measured at the end of each period, which is every quarter, and is not seasonally adjusted. The 
data is taken from the database FRED at the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.32   
 
  
                                                 
31
 http://www.census.gov/const/www/newressalesindex_excel.html, Accessed 2009-01-06 
32 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/EQTA?cid=93, Accessed 2009-01-05 
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EXCRES_RES  
This is the cyclical fluctuations of the ratio of excess reserves of depositary institutions to total 
reserves. Excess reserves are measured in billions of Dollars on a monthly basis and are not 
seasonally adjusted. In this study the value of the last month of each quarter is used to represent 
the quarterly measure. This data is taken from the database FRED.33 Total reserves are available 
through the flow of funds accounts of US-chartered commercial banks published by the Federal 
Reserve. The measure is stated in millions of Dollars and is not seasonally adjusted.34  
 
FEDFUNDSRATE  
The federal funds rate is the interest rate at which banks lend balances at the Federal Reserve to 
other banks overnight. This market rate does not normally deviate much from the federal funds 
rate target. Changes in the federal funds rate are believed to trigger a chain of events that can 
affect the exchange rate, long-term interest rates and much more. This interest rate certainly 
influences the interest rates at which banks lend to their customers too. The federal funds rate is 
transformed from monthly to quarterly periodicity by using the observation of the last month of 
each quarter. The data is provided by the Federal Reserve.35  
 
GDPNOM  
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) is an agency that provides important economic statistics 
such as the gross domestic product used here. GDPNOM is seasonally adjusted nominal GDP in 
billions of Dollars and is measured quarterly. The variable has been transformed into the 
quarterly growth rate.36    
 
  
                                                 
33
 http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/EXCRESNS?rid=19&soid=1, Accessed 2009-01-05 
34
 http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/default.htm, Accessed 2009-01-05 
35
 http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/default.htm, Accessed 2009-01-05 
36
 http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp, Accessed 2009-01-06 
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LOANSLEASESNSA  
LOANSLEASESNSA is the quarterly growth rate of total loans and leases from the consolidated 
balance sheet of US-chartered commercial banks. This implies that claims on other US-chartered 
banks are netted so that loans are not counted twice. What about off-balance sheet loans such as 
mortgage-backed securities then? If a bank sells e.g. mortgage-backed securities to another bank, 
the security will show up on the balance sheet of the buying bank as a security and not a loan. 
Thereby securitized loans are not included in total loans and leases. Instead they comprise a large 
share of total bank credit, in which loans are also included. It can also be worth mentioning that 
when estimating money supply, deposits at US-chartered commercial banks are measured. Total 
loans and leases are not seasonally adjusted and stated in millions of Dollars.37  
 
NPLTOTLOANS  
This variable is the cyclical fluctuations of total nonperforming loans divided by total loans. 
Nonperforming loans are classified as loans 90-days or more past due or nonaccrual by bank 
managers. This data can be found in the FRED database described earlier. It is measured 
quarterly at the end of each period.38  
 
RELGR_DELRT  
RELGR_DELRT is the relative quarterly growth rate of the delinquency rate of real estate loans 
to the delinquency rate of total loans and leases. The relative growth rate can be expressed as:  
𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐺𝑅_𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑅𝑇 = ln
𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑅𝑇_𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑡
𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑅𝑇_𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐿𝐸𝐴𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑁𝑆𝐴𝑡
− ln
𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑅𝑇_𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑡−1
𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑅𝑇_𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐿𝐸𝐴𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑁𝑆𝐴𝑡−1
 Equation 4.1 
where 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑅𝑇_𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑡  and 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑅𝑇_𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐿𝐸𝐴𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑁𝑆𝐴𝑡  are the delinquency rates of real 
estate loans and total loans and leases respectively at time 𝑡. Delinquent loans are defined as loans 
past due thirty days or more and still accruing interest as well those in nonaccrual status. The 
                                                 
37
 http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/default.htm, Accessed 2010-01-05 
38
 http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/NPTLTL?cid=93, Accessed 2010-01-07 
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delinquency rate refers to the percentage of delinquent loans to total loans of a specified category, 
for example real estate loans. The delinquency rate is measured at the end of each quarter.39   
 
RELGR_LOANS  
This denotes the relative growth rate of real estate loans to total loans and leases Real estate loans 
at US-chartered commercial banks. It can be written as follows:  
𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐺𝑅_𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆 = ln
𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑡
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐿𝐸𝐴𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑁𝑆𝐴𝑡
− ln
𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑡−1
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐿𝐸𝐴𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑁𝑆𝐴𝑡−1
 Equation 4.2 
𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑡  and 𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐿𝐸𝐴𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑁𝑆𝐴𝑡  are real estate loans and total loans and leases respectively 
at time 𝑡. Real estate loans include both residential and commercial loans and are not seasonally 
adjusted.40  
 
ROE  
ROE is return on equity for US banks and is provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
The data is measured at the end of each quarter and is designated in annualized percent. It is not 
seasonally adjusted and has been de-trended by the Hodrick-Prescott filter.41  
  
                                                 
39
 http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/chargeoff/delallnsa.htm#fn1, Accessed 2010-01-07 
40
 http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/default.htm, Accessed 2010-01-07 
41
 http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USROE?cid=93, Accessed 2010-01-05 
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5 Econometric method 
5.1 Unit root test 
In order for regression models containing time series data to be estimated correctly it is required 
that the time series are stationary. Regressions with non-stationary variables generally give high R2 
and insignificant p-values. However, non-stationary series can be used in a meaningful regression 
if they are co-integrated but for now on we focus on stationarity. For a time series to be strictly 
stationary the joint distribution of 𝑦𝑡  and 𝑦𝑡−k  must not depend on time (𝑡). This is very rare and 
therefore often only weak stationarity is tested for. 𝐸[𝑦𝑡], 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑦𝑡] and 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟[𝑦𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡−1] are 
constant for weakly stationary series. This can be tested by ensuring that 𝜌 in the equations below 
is less than 1.  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜌𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡  Equation 5.1 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝜌𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡  Equation 5.2 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝜌𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  Equation 5.3 
Equation 5.1 does not contain an intercept which equations 5.2 and 5.3 do whereas equation 5.3 
contains a time trend that the other two equations lack. If 𝜌 is equal to 1, 𝑦𝑡  contains a unit root. 
To see why 𝜌 has to be less than 1 we can derive 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑦𝑡] from equation 5.2 which gives us:   
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑦𝑡] =
𝜎𝜀𝑡
2
1 − 𝜌2
 
Equation 5.4 
where 𝜌 = 1 is impossible and 𝜌 > 1 implies a negative variance. A stationary series is mean 
reverting as it moves towards its mean 𝛼0 (0 in the case without an intercept). To test whether 𝜌 
is less than 1, equations 5.1 - 5.3 are normally re-written as:  
∆𝑦𝑡 = (1 − 𝜌)𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡  Equation 5.5 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + (1 − 𝜌)𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡  Equation 5.6 
Master’s thesis – Credit boom or credit crunch?    
Page 19 of 51 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + (1 − 𝜌)𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  Equation 5.7 
The advantage of this is that most econometric programs automatically give the t-values and 
corresponding p-values for the coefficients (1 − 𝜌). We now test if  1 − 𝜌  is equal to 0. 
Unfortunately the t-value for (1 − 𝜌) is biased as it is not asymptotically normally distributed due 
to the presence of the regressor 𝑦𝑡−1. Instead t has a so called Dickey-Fuller distribution, named 
after its founders Dickey and Fuller (1979), which critical values have been estimated by for 
instance MacKinnon (1991). The unit root tests (Dickey-Fuller tests) in equations 5.5 – 5.7 can 
be augmented with more than one lag of 𝑦𝑡  in order to fit AR (Autoregressive) models with a 
higher order than 1. In this case the tests are simply called Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. 
The ADF version of equation 5.6 will then take the form:  
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + (1 − 𝜌)𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛼1∆𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑝−1∆𝑦𝑡−𝑝+1 + 𝜀𝑡  Equation 5.8 
When a time series is tested for a unit root and it turns out not be stationary the series may be 
stationary after differentiation. In this case we say that it is integrated of order one, I(1). Likewise, 
a series that becomes stationary after a second differentiation is integrated of order two, I(2). If 
co-integration is present the variables, for example 𝑦 and 𝑥, have a common trend. This can be 
tested by estimating the regression in equation 5.9 and testing whether its residual contains a unit 
root in equation 5.10. In other words, we now test if  1 − 𝜌  is equal to 0.  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 Equation 5.9 
Δ𝜀𝑡 = (1 − 𝜌)𝜀𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡  Equation 5.10 
When the ADF test is used for testing co-integration between 𝑦 and 𝑥 critical values for two 
variables are required. 42  
 
                                                 
42
 Harris R. och Sollis R. (2003), pp. 25-108  
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5.2 Hodrick-Prescott filter  
Many macroeconomic and financial time series fluctuate around a growing time trend. GDP, for 
example, fluctuates around a growing time trend that is generally denoted potential GDP. The 
cyclical components of GDP, i.e. when GDP is above or below potential GDP, are of great 
interest when studying business cycles. The cyclical component 𝑐𝑡  is normally written 
𝑐𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡 
Equation 5.11 
where 𝑦𝑡  is GDP and 𝑔𝑡  is potential GDP. All variables in equation 5.11 are in logarithmic form. 
Naturally, cyclical fluctuations can be of interest for many time series other than GDP. A method 
that is widely used in macroeconomics to estimate cyclical fluctuations is the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter (HP-filter). This method is named after the American economists Robert Hodrick and 
Edward Prescott. The filter can also be described as a device to de-trend time series making them 
stationary. Put differently, time series become mean-reverting as they fluctuate around the long 
run growth path (potential GDP for GDP) with the mean 0. The HP-filter is obtained by 
minimizing the expression in equation 5.12 below with respect to all of the 𝑔𝑡 .  
HP  =   𝑦𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡     
𝐶𝑡
2𝑇
𝑡=1 + 𝜆    𝑔𝑡+1 − 𝑔𝑡  𝑔𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡−1              
𝐶𝑕𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡𝑕 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
 
2
𝑇−1
𝑡=2  
Equation 5.12 
The parameter 𝜆 is the weight of changes in the trend growth rate and determines the 
smoothness of the trend. Since this parameter is chosen by the observer, the cyclical fluctuations 
can have different appearances. 𝜆 is often set to 1600 for quarterly time series.43 
 
5.3 Dynamic regression models 
A dynamic regression model can be written as:  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑦𝑡−1+𝛽0𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 Equation 5.13 
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 Sörensen P.B. and Whitta-Jacobsen H. J. (2005), pp. 397-430  
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This model is referred to as an autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL) and it can be 
consistently estimated with OLS (Ordinary Least Squares). Naturally more lags can be added if 
required. Equation 5.14 is called the impact multiplier whereas 5.15 is the long-run multiplier.  
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑥𝑡
= 𝛽
0
 
Equation 5.14 
𝛽
0
+ 𝛽
1
1 − 𝛼1
 
Equation 5.15 
Another dynamic model used for multivariate regressions is the vector autoregressive (VAR) 
model. It only includes lagged values of the explanatory variables and is displayed in equation 
5.16.  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛿1 + 𝛼11𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜀1𝑡 
𝑥𝑡 = 𝛿2 + 𝛼21𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽22𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜀2𝑡 
Equation 5.16 
The dynamic evolution of a number of variables is described from their common history in the 
VAR model. The use of the model was advocated by the economist Christopher Sims as it does 
not require any a priori distinction between endogenous and exogenous variables. This entails a 
theory-free method for estimation of economic relationships if desired.44  
 
5.4 Granger causality  
“Correlation does not imply causation” is a phrase commonly used in statistics. It means that 
correlation between, for example, two variables does not automatically imply that one causes the 
other. In other words, the causation might be the opposite. In order to investigate causation the 
economist and Nobel laureate45 Clive Granger developed a test in 1969 that has been called 
“Granger Causality”. The Grange causality test is a significance test to see if lagged values of the 
explanatory variable, or variables in the multivariate case, have any predictive power for the 
dependent variable. The regression in the test is a VAR model and variables can thereby be tested 
                                                 
44 Verbeek M. (2008), pp. 269-354 
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 http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2003/index.html, Accessed 2009-12-03  
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either pair wise or all together in a multivariate regression. 46 A Granger test with two variables, 𝑦 
and 𝑥, and with lag length 𝑙 will look like equation 5.17 and 5.18 below.  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑡−𝑙 + 𝑏1𝑥𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝑏𝑥𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜀𝑡  Equation 5.17 
𝑥𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑥𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝑎𝑙𝑥𝑡−𝑙 + 𝑏1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝑏𝑦𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜀𝑡  Equation 5.18 
When the regressions are estimated a joint significance test for the coefficients 𝑏1 to 𝑏𝑙  is 
performed (in the case of equation 5.17), which is done by testing if  𝑏1 = 𝑏2 = ⋯ = 𝑏𝑙 = 0.
 47 
If we denote the regression 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑡−𝑙  the restricted model (𝑟) and 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑡−𝑙 + 𝑏1𝑥𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝑏𝑥𝑡−𝑙  the unrestricted model (𝑢𝑟) the joint 
significance can be determined with an F-test as described below.  
𝐹 =
(𝑅𝑢𝑟
2 − 𝑅𝑟
2)/𝑗
(1 − 𝑅𝑢𝑟
2 )/(𝑡 − 𝑘)
~𝐹𝑗 ,𝑡−𝑘  
Equation 5.19 
𝑗 is the number of restrictions, 𝑡 the number of observations and 𝑘 the number of regressors 
including the intercept. Assymptotically the F-distribution approximates the x2-distribution which 
implies that a significance test based on the x2-distribution can be applied instead. The lag length 
can be chosen by the maximum time period the variables are believed to affect each other, which 
might be quite an arbitrary choice. Alternatively, the choice of lag length could be determined by 
an information criterion such as BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion). Under the assumption of 
normally distributed residuals BIC is written as:  
𝐵𝐼𝐶 = ln
1
𝑡
 𝑒𝑖
2
𝑡
𝑖=1
+
𝑘
𝑡
ln 𝑡 
Equation 5.20 
BIC penalizes the number of the regressors unlike R2 and to a greater extent than for instance 
AIC (Akaike Information Criterion), which is not discussed in this thesis.48  
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5.5 General-to-specific modeling  
When estimating regression models with many explanatory variables there is a small chance that 
we reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient is 0 although this is wrong (type I error). This 
kind of error is very likely to occur if a long sequence of tests is performed to select variables to 
include in our model. This is often called data snooping or data mining. The likelihood of 
including wrong variables is particularly high when the specification search is from simple to 
general, i.e. when you start with few variables and add more as they turn out to be significant. 
Another common approach is general-to-specific modeling advocated by Professor David 
Hendry among others. This approach is typically referred to as the LSE (London School of 
Economics) Methodology. Adherents of this methodology start with an unrestricted model that 
includes many explanatory variables, on which restrictions are imposed. Eventually, they end up 
with a model that contains only significant variables. General-to-specific modeling is relatively 
insensitive to data-mining problems as only the true specification will survive the specification 
tests when sample size grows to infinity White (1990) concludes.49  
In this thesis an automated step-wise regression will be used for the downward reduction of the 
unrestricted model to the parsimonious model. First forward and backward significance levels are 
set to for example 0,05 (5 %). The stepwise regression procedure starts by estimating a regression 
with all selected variables (unrestricted model). Thereafter it removes the least significant variable 
(the variable with the highest p-value), as long as it its p-value is higher than our chosen 
backward significance level, and estimates a new regression without the removed variable. Once 
again the variable with the highest p-value is removed and the regression is re-estimated without 
it. Now the two removed variables are tested to see if any of them can be significantly added back 
into the model given the forward significance value. Every time a variable has been removed all 
removed variables are re-tested for inclusion in the regression model. The procedure continues 
until we end up with only significant variables according to our chosen significance levels.50  
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5.6 Tests for structural breaks  
It is interesting to see if regression coefficients are stable over time. If coefficients have changed 
at any point in time we say that a structural break has occurred. In order to test whether a 
coefficient in one period is significantly different from a coefficient in another period we can 
specify following test:  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑡 + 𝛾𝑔𝑡𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 Equation 5.21 
where 𝑔𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to 0 and 1 for period 1 and 2 respectively. If the coefficient 𝛾 
is significant, a structural break has occurred. This test can be performed as a mass significance 
test in a multivariate regression with several explanatory variables including the intercept. In that 
case an F-test similar to that explained in section 5.4 is used. This is generally referred to as the 
Chow test for structural change or simply Chow’s breakpoint test.51  
When we do not have any a priori assumptions of when a structural break might have occurred, 
or instead of making an arbitrary in choosing a potential structural break date, a structural break 
can be searched for. The idea behind this method, that is called Quandt-Andrews breakpoint test, 
is that a Chow breakpoint test is performed at every observation between two specified dates and 
then the date with the most significant structural break is chosen. As the distribution of all the 
individual breakpoint tests becomes less credible at the beginning and the end of all observations 
the first and the last observations are normally excluded. A standard level for this “trimming” is 
15 percent, which means that the first and the last 7,5 percent of the observations are excluded.52  
 
5.7 Variance Inflation Factor  
If the correlation between two explanatory variables in a regression model is too high, it may lead 
to problems. This phenomenon is called multicollinearity and may result in unreliable estimates 
such as high standard errors and wrong signs of coefficients. In order to detect multicollinearity 
the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is often used and is defined as follows:  
                                                 
51
 Verbeek M. (2008), pp. 66-67 
52
 Eviews 6 User’s Guide (2007) 
Master’s thesis – Credit boom or credit crunch?    
Page 25 of 51 
𝑉𝐼𝐹 𝑏𝑘 =
1
1 − 𝑅𝑘
2 
Equation 5.22 
𝑉𝐼𝐹 𝑏𝑘  is the VIF of coefficient 𝑏𝑘 and 𝑅𝑘
2 denotes the R2 obtained from regressing xk on the 
other explanatory variables. If the Variance Inflation Factor is higher than 2053, multicollinearity 
can cause problems. This value can therefore be used as critical value.54  
 
5.8 Contribution to R2  
A regression model does not explicitly tell which variable that is the most important in explaining 
the variation of the dependent variable. To estimate the importance of the explanatory variables 
R2 can be decomposed into contributions of the explanatory variables. One way of doing this is 
to run a regression with standardized variables for which standardized regression coefficients are 
obtained. A standardized variable is a variable with a standard error equal to one and a mean that 
is zero. The standardized regression coefficients are then multiplied with the correlation between 
each corresponding explanatory variable and the dependent variable. This gives us contribution 
to R2 which is more easily illustrated as:  
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑅2  𝑜𝑓 𝑥𝑗 = 𝑏𝑗𝜌𝑦𝑥𝑗  Equation 5.23 
𝑎𝑛𝑑                 𝑅2 =  𝑏𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
𝜌𝑦𝑥𝑗  
Equation 5.24 
where 𝑏𝑗  is the standardized regression coefficient and 𝜌𝑦𝑥𝑗 is the correlation coefficient between 
𝑦 and 𝑥𝑗.55  
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6 Results and analysis  
6.1 Stationarity analysis  
In order to find out which variables that are stationary, so that they can be used in a regression, 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests are performed. Some of the variables used are ratios, e.g. 
CAPASSET, and if these are found not to be stationary they will be de-trended by the Hodrick-
Prescott filter instead of being differentiated. The reason for this is that the level, rather than the 
increase or decrease, is of interest according to the chosen theories. Assume that a reasonable 
level for CAPASSET, that is not stable over time, has been set individually by banks. In that case 
it would be the cyclical fluctuations of the ratio that are of interest. For those variables de-
trended by the HP-filter,  𝜆 has been set to 1600 as this value is recommended for quarterly time 
series, as discussed earlier. Variables that are not denominated as ratios, or in percent, are first 
tested in logarithmic level form. If they are not found to be stationary, they will be differentiated. 
A differentiation of a variable in logarithmic form gives the growth rate, in this case the quarterly 
growth rate. The lag lengths of the ADF tests have been chosen by the minimum BIC value of a 
maximum lag length of 12 quarters. The results are displayed below.  
Table 6.1   ADF test with an intercept, BIC maximum 12 lags 
  Level  HP-filter 
  t-Statistic p-value lags  t-Statistic p-value lags 
CAPASSET  -0,586 0,867 0  -4,092 0,002 1 
EXCRES_RES  1,027 0,997 0  -4,859 0,000 0 
FEDFUNDSRATE  -2,858 0,055 3     
NPLTOTLOANS  -1,600 0,478 5  -5,518 0,000 4 
ROE  -0,442 0,896 4  -5,352 0,000 4 
  
Table 6.2   ADF test with an intercept, BIC maximum 12 lags 
  LN(Level)  DLN(Level) 
  t-Statistic p-value lags  t-Statistic p-value lags 
AVPRICEHOUSES  -1,161 0,688 5  -12,723 0,000 0 
GDPNOM  -1,771 0,392 1  -3,544 0,009 1 
LOANSLEASESNSA  0,613 0,989 1  -5,897 0,000 0 
The tables above show that the variables CAPASSET, EXCRES_RES, NPLTOTLOANS and 
ROE are not stationary in level form and have therefore been transformed by the HP-filter to 
describe cyclical fluctuations. When extracting cyclical fluctuations the logarithmic level form of 
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the variable is normally used in order to get deviations from the trend in percent. This procedure 
has not been possible to apply to ROE as it contains negative numbers. Therefore this variable 
has been kept in level form when extracting the cyclical fluctuations. FEDFUNDSRATE is 
significant on the 0,10 level and almost significant on the 0,05 level. This variable has therefore 
been kept in level. AVPRICEHOUSES, GDPNOM and LOANSLEASESNSA will be used as 
quarterly growth rates.  
 
6.2 Analysis of correlation and bivariate causation  
Before moving on to the general-to-specific regression it can be valuable to unravel correlations 
between the explanatory variables and LOANSLEASESNSA at different lag lengths. This is not 
merely a way to investigate whether the correlation is negative or positive but also a way to 
describe the lag structure. If we assume that there is a strong correlation between two variables at 
a lag length of 5 quarters, a lag length of 3 quarters in the general-to-specific model will most 
likely be too narrow to express the full relationship.  
Let us start by examining the correlation between EXCRES_RES and LOANSLEASESNSA. In 
the diagram below correlations between -10 to +8 quarters can be seen.  
Diagram 6.1  Correlogram 
 
LOANSLEASESNSA, like many other economic variables, exhibits persistence as the correlation 
stays positive a couple of quarters both backwards and forwards. A seasonal pattern is also visible 
as the correlation at quarters one and two years in both directions is stronger than others. The 
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highest correlation between LOANSLEASESNSA and EXCRES_RES is present at -2 quarters 
suggesting that EXCRES_RES leads LOANSLEASESNSA by two quarters, which is somewhat 
confusing. On theoretical grounds one was expecting to find that more excess reserves lead to 
higher bank lending instead of less bank lending. A Granger causality test in table 6.3 also 
confirms the negative causation from EXCRES_RES to LOANSLEASESNSA. The lag length 
has been chosen by the minimum BIC value of maximum 4 lags.  
Table 6.3   Granger causality, BIC maximum 4 lags 
 BIC lags/df Chi-sq Prob. 
LOANSLEASESNSA → EXCRES_RES 1,4275 1 3,4461 0,0634 
EXCRES_RES → LOANSLEASESNSA -5,9439 1 20,9390 0,0000 
Perhaps the negative correlation tells us something about banks’ willingness to hold excess 
reserves. A possible explanation to this is that banks may prefer to hold excess reserves in 
periods considered as risky as an arrangement to protect themselves against potential bank runs 
or future losses. The risk level then translates into lower bank lending. In that case lower bank 
lending is not a direct result of more excess reserves. The negative correlation also strengthens 
the view of the Federal Reserve and Goodhart (1989) that reserve requirements are no 
constraints to bank lending as the Federal Reserve accommodates such lending expansions 
through open market operations. On the other hand, the correlation is positive at -10 to -4 
quarters, which could be interpreted as that the relationship between excess reserves and bank 
lending works with a long delay.  
Diagram 6.2  Correlogram  
 
-0,8
-0,6
-0,4
-0,2
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
C
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
Quarter
CAPASSET LOANSLEASESNSA NPLTOTLOANS
Master’s thesis – Credit boom or credit crunch?    
Page 29 of 51 
CAPASSET seems to lead LOANSLEASESNSA by a few quarters and has a positive 
correlation, as can be seen in diagram 6.2. This is in line with the theory. Also NPLTOT behaves 
as expected and shows a negative correlation with bank lending. The Granger test below suggests 
that there is bidirectional causation between bank lending and the capital to asset ratio. The fact 
that the causation from LOANSLEASENSA to CAPASSET is negative is not surprising and 
implies that more bank lending leads to a lower capital to asset-ratio as bank loans are bank 
assets. The two-way relationship is therefore not considered to be peculiar.  
Table 6.4   Granger causality, BIC maximum 4 lags 
 BIC lags/df Chi-sq Prob. 
LOANSLEASESNSA → CAPASSET -5,2001 2 11,0268 0,0040 
CAPASSET → LOANSLEASESNSA -5,7442 2 8,3717 0,0152 
LOANSLEASESNSA → NPLTOTLOANS -3,1944 3 7,8168 0,0500 
NPLTOTLOANS → LOANSLEASESNSA -5,8790 1 14,5997 0,0001 
There is also bidirectional causation in the case of NPLTOTLOANS and LOANSLEASENSA at 
the 0,05 level. Theory points out that nonperforming loans lead bank lending with a negative 
correlation but what about the opposite causation? It could be that less bank lending amplifies 
the nonperforming loans ratio as less lending creates a severe economic climate for households 
and companies which in turn makes it more difficult for them to amortize loans. However, the 
causation from NPLTOTLOANS to LOANSLEASESNSA is strongest and can therefore not be 
overlooked. Next we consider FEDFUNDSRATE and GDPNOM displayed below.  
Diagram 6.3  Correlogram 
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leads bank lending by a few quarters and exhibits a positive correlation. The Granger causality 
test in table 6.5 indicates that the causations just discussed cannot be rejected.  
Table 6.5   Granger causality, BIC maximum 4 lags 
 BIC lags/df Chi-sq Prob. 
LOANSLEASESNSA → GDPNOM -7,2516 1 0,3631 0,5468 
GDPNOM → LOANSLEASESNSA -5,8270 1 9,7986 0,0017 
LOANSLEASESNSA → FEDFUNDSRATE 1,9624 3 2,9913 0,3930 
FEDFUNDSRATE → LOANSLEASESNSA -5,8027 2 13,5122 0,0012 
 
In the diagram 6.4 we compare AVPRICEHOUSES and ROE with LOANSLEASESNSA. Both 
AVPRICEHOUSES and ROE lead bank lending and have a positive correlation. The Granger 
test in table 6.6 supports this observation and thereby the causations are as expected. Hence, 
there is evidence that increasing prices of collateral, such as real estate, may make banks more 
willing to lend in a manner that is described by Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano (2006).  
Diagram 6.4  Correlogram  
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6.3 General-to-specific analysis of bank lending  
The seven potential explanatory variables of bank lending discussed in the previous section are 
now used in a general-to-specific regression model. They are added to the regression with lags 
from 1 to 6 quarters as this seems to be appropriate based on the correlations in the correlograms 
in section 6.2. Lags (1 to 6 quarters) of the dependent variable, LOANSLEASESNSA, have also 
been added. Therefore the unrestricted regression is a VAR model. The intercept, C, and the 
seasonal dummies, S2, S3 and S4, will always be included in the regression in order to capture 
seasonalities. The downward reduction of the regression uses the significance level 0,01. The 
result of this regression (regression 1) is displayed in table 6.7 below.  
Table 6.7   Regression 1  
General-to-specific, 0,01 significance level, lags of explanatory variables: 1-6 
Dependent Variable: LOANSLEASESNSA     
Sample (adjusted): 1989Q2 2009Q3     
Included observations: 82 after adjustments    
      
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. Contribution 
R2 
S2 0,0137 0,0028 4,8248 0,0000  
S3 0,0080 0,0027 2,9973 0,0038  
S4 0,0154 0,0028 5,5576 0,0000  
C 0,0136 0,0029 4,6811 0,0000  
AVPRICEHOUSES(-2) 0,1774 0,0387 4,5844 0,0000 0,1310 
AVPRICEHOUSES(-3) 0,1477 0,0399 3,7011 0,0004 0,0749 
EXCRES_RES(-1) -0,0099 0,0021 -4,8111 0,0000 0,1367 
FEDFUNDSRATE(-1) 0,0057 0,0011 5,2845 0,0000 0,0915 
FEDFUNDSRATE(-4) -0,0076 0,0011 -7,1838 0,0000 0,2657 
NPLTOTLOANS(-4) 0,0894 0,0269 3,3245 0,0014 -0,2090 
NPLTOTLOANS(-5) -0,1044 0,0263 -3,9716 0,0002 0,1082 
      
R-squared 0,7482      Mean dependent var 0,0156 
Adjusted R-squared 0,7128      S.D. dependent var 0,0155 
S.E. of regression 0,0083      Akaike info criterion -6,6157 
Sum squared resid 0,0049      Schwarz criterion -6,2928 
Log likelihood 282,2426      Hannan-Quinn criter. -6,4861 
F-statistic 21,0996      Durbin-Watson stat 2,0398 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000     
The parsimonious regression model shows that four explanatory variables survived the 
downward reduction from general to specific model. Two lags of the variables 
AVPRICEHOUSES, FEDFUNDSRATE and NPLTOTLOANS are significant whereas only 
one lag of EXCRES_RES is significant. The result of a similar regression but with a significance 
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level of 0,05 gives the same explanatory variables. This regression can be found in the appendix 
and is denoted regression 2. Regression 1 shows very high explanatory power, R2 0,7482, and 
does not exhibit any sign of violating e.g. the OLS assumptions in table 6.8. However, the 
contribution to R2 seen in table 6.7 is negative for the variable NPLTOTLOANS(-4) which 
makes the total contribution of NPLTOTLOANS to R2 negative. It sounds very odd that a 
variable with negative contribution to R2 has survived the downward reduction of the model. 
Therefore one might expect multicollinearity in the regression.  
Table 6.8   Diagnostic tests of regression 1 
RESET test - 2 fitted items F-statistic 0,6254     Prob.  0,5380 
Normality test Jarque-Bera 1,3937     Prob.  0,4982 
Breusch-Godfrey - 4 lags F-statistic 0,2792     Prob.  0,8905 
Breusch-Pagan F-statistic 0,6161     Prob.  0,7952 
Ljung-Box/ARCH test - 4 lags Q-stat 1,3559     Prob.  0,8520 
Multicollinearity is tested for by measuring the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) in table 6.9 below. 
Table 6.9   Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) – regression 1 
 R2 VIF 
AVPRICEHOUSES(-2) 0,2723 1,3742 
AVPRICEHOUSES(-3) 0,2572 1,3462 
EXCRES_RES(-1) 0,2636 1,3579 
FEDFUNDSRATE(-1) 0,8493 6,6351 
FEDFUNDSRATE(-4) 0,8388 6,2033 
NPLTOTLOANS(-4) 0,9637 27,5391 
NPLTOTLOANS(-5) 0,9616 26,0675 
The VIF indicates that multicollinearity is present in the regression as the two lags of 
NPLTOTLOANS have values of VIF above 20. The correlation matrix reveals a high correlation 
between NPLTOTLOANS(-4) and NPLTOTLOANS(-5). Hence it is likely that the inclusion of 
two lags of NPLTOTLOANS caused the problem of multicollinearity. Regression 1 is therefore 
re-estimated but this time with only one lag of NPLTOTLOANS, NPLTOTLOANS(-5). This 
regression is called regression 3 and is found in the appendix. In regression 3 FEDFUNDSRATE 
exhibits multicollinearity. Therefore it may be more appropriate to run a new regression with only 
one lag of each explanatory variable in order to estimate the relative importance of the 
explanatory variables defined by their contributions to R2.  
Regression 4 in table 6.10 is the downward reduction of an unrestricted model with only one lag 
of each explanatory variable chosen by the maximum correlation with LOANSLEASENSA 
between -1 and -6 quarters. The significance level is 0,01. This specification gives the same 
Master’s thesis – Credit boom or credit crunch?    
Page 33 of 51 
explanatory variables as before with the exception of AVPRICEHOUSES. However, 
AVPRICEHOUSES is significant on the 0,05 significance level as seen in regression 5 in the 
appendix.  
Table 6.10   Regression 4  
General-to-specific, 0,01 significance level, lags of explanatory variables: only preselected  
Dependent Variable: LOANSLEASESNSA  
Sample (adjusted): 1989Q3 2009Q3  
Included observations: 81 after adjustments 
      
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.* Contribution 
R2 
S2 0,0109 0,0034 3,1999 0,0020  
S3 0,0113 0,0034 3,3700 0,0012  
S4 0,0158 0,0034 4,6079 0,0000  
C 0,0167 0,0037 4,5248 0,0000  
EXCRES_RES(-2) -0,0080 0,0026 -3,0112 0,0036 0,1143 
FEDFUNDSRATE(-6) -0,0023 0,0006 -4,0791 0,0001 0,1242 
NPLTOTLOANS(-1) -0,0275 0,0069 -4,0089 0,0001 0,1755 
      
R-squared 0,5672      Mean dependent var 0,0155 
Adjusted R-squared 0,5321      S.D. dependent var 0,0156 
S.E. of regression 0,0107      Akaike info criterion -6,1589 
Sum squared resid 0,0084      Schwarz criterion -5,9520 
Log likelihood 256,4373      Hannan-Quinn criter. -6,0759 
F-statistic 16,1607      Durbin-Watson stat 1,7921 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000     
Regression 4 does not violate any of the assumptions of OLS tested for in table 6.11 at the 0,05 
significance level but the RESET test is almost significant. This could be a sign that the correct 
specification of the model consists of more lags. The problem of multicollinearity seems to have 
been avoided to judge by the Variance Inflation Factor in table 6.12.  
  
Table 6.11   Diagnostic tests of regression 4 
RESET test - 2 fitted items F-statistic 2,9970     Prob.  0,0562 
Normality test Jarque-Bera 3,5574     Prob.  0,1689 
Breusch-Godfrey - 4 lags F-statistic 1,5147     Prob.  0,2073 
Breusch-Pagan F-statistic 1,1012     Prob.  0,3699 
Ljung-Box/ARCH test - 4 lags Q-stat 3,6722     Prob.  0,4520 
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Table 6.12   Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) – regression 4 
 R2 VIF 
EXCRES_RES(-2) 0,1972 1,2457 
FEDFUNDSRATE(-6) 0,0563 1,0597 
NPLTOTLOANS(-1) 0,2116 1,2683 
As no multicollinearity is present, regression 4 will most likely give us more credible 
contributions to R2. Table 6.10 indicates that NPLTOTLOANS is the most important variable in 
explaining bank lending followed by FEDFUNDSRATE and EXCRES_RES respectively.  
It is valuable to see if the coefficients are stable over time. For this purpose a Quandt-Andrews 
breakpoint test with a trimming of 10 percent has been carried out in table 6.13. This test cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of no structural break. The conclusion is therefore that the variables are 
stable over the time period covered in this study.  
Table 6.13   Quandt-Andrews breakpoint test – regression 4 
 Maximum F-statistic Probability 
(2006Q3)  3,6405 1,0000 
The CUSUM test does not either detect any instability of the equation as the cumulative sum of 
the recursive residuals never crosses the two lines representing the 0,05 significance level in the 
chart below.  
Diagram 6.5  CUSUM test  
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Multivariate Granger causality tests are also performed for the variables in regression 4 to see if 
the bivariate causations in section 6.2 hold. The results in table 6.14 indicate that 
FEDFUNDSRATE and EXCRES_RES cause LOANSLEASESNSA at the 0,05 level. 
NPLTOTLOANS is only significant on the 0,10 signifiance level. It is likely that this is a result of 
multicollinearity as discussed earlier. LOANSLEASESNSA does not significantly cause 
EXCRES_RES, FEDFUNDSRATE or NPLTOTLOANS at the 0,05 or 0,10 level. Therefore, 
this suggests that none of the explanatory variables in regression 4 is inaccurately used as an 
explanatory variable in the regression.  
Table 6.14   Multivariate (VAR) Granger causality tests – regression 4, BIC max 4 lags 
Dependent variable: LOANSLEASESNSA, BIC -5,9549 (2 lags) 
 Chi-sq lags/df Prob. 
FEDFUNDSRATE → LOANSLEASESNSA 11,9632 2 0,0025 
EXCRES_RES → LOANSLEASESNSA 17,9848 2 0,0001 
NPLTOTLOANS → LOANSLEASESNSA 4,9221 2 0,0853 
    
Dependent variable: FEDFUNDSRATE, BIC 1,9028 (2 lags) 
 Chi-sq lags/df Prob. 
LOANSLEASESNSA → FEDFUNDSRATE 1,8295 2 0,4006 
EXCRES_RES → FEDFUNDSRATE 7,7928 2 0,0203 
NPLTOTLOANS → FEDFUNDSRATE 25,8299 2 0,0000 
    
Dependent variable: EXCRES_RES, BIC 1,4517 (1 lag) 
 Chi-sq lags/df Prob. 
LOANSLEASESNSA → EXCRES_RES 0,0573 1 0,8108 
FEDFUNDSRATE → EXCRES_RES 0,0029 1 0,9571 
NPLTOTLOANS → EXCRES_RES 4,7990 1 0,0285 
    
Dependent variable: NPLTOTLOANS, BIC -3,0610 (2 lags) 
 Chi-sq lags/df Prob. 
LOANSLEASESNSA → NPLTOTLOANS 3,5527 2 0,1693 
FEDFUNDSRATE → NPLTOTLOANS 6,1037 2 0,0473 
EXCRES_RES → NPLTOTLOANS 1,2556 2 0,5338 
At last, the results of the five regressions performed are summarized in table 6.15. As can be 
seen, AVPRICEHOUSES, EXCRES_RES, FEDFUNDSRATE and NPLTOTLOANS are 
significant in all of them except regression 4 where AVPRICEHOUSES was insignificant at the 
0,01 level. The sums of the coefficients of each variable (long-run multipliers) are rather similar in 
all regressions and have the same sign. The contributions to R2 of all lags (if any) of each 
explanatory variable are somewhat spurious in regression 1 and 2 as NPLTOTLOANS 
contributes negatively to the R2 value. This is regarded as a product of multicollinearity, which 
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makes the contributions to R2 more reliable in regression 4 and 5. Therefore NPLTOLOANS 
seems to be the most important variable in explaining bank lending. This result was also obtained 
in regression 3, but in that case the lags of FEDFUNDSRATE exhibited high correlation that 
resulted in multicollinearity.  
Table 6.15   Regression summary 
Regression 1 2 3 4 5 
Significance level 0,01 0,05 0,01 0,01 0,05 
R2 0,7482 0,7858 0,6780 0,5672 0,5953 
Adjusted R2 0,7128 0,7449 0,6388 0,5321 0,5565 
BIC -6,2928 -6,2934 -6,1317 -5,9520 -5,9650 
Observations 82 82 84 81 81 
      
Sum of coefficients:       
AVPRICEHOUSES 0,3251 0,3735 0,2813 - 0,1015 
EXCRES_RES -0,0099 -0,0130 -0,0081 -0,0080 -0,0072 
FEDFUNDSRATE -0,0019 -0,0018 -0,0015 -0,0023 -0,0022 
NPLTOTLOANS -0,0150 -0,0187 -0,0252 -0,0275 -0,0255 
      
Contribution R2:      
AVPRICEHOUSES 0,2059 0,1926 0,1724 - 0,0756 
EXCRES_RES 0,1367 0,1358 0,1159 0,1143 0,1039 
FEDFUNDSRATE 0,3572 0,2861 0,1206 0,1242 0,1156 
NPLTOTLOANS -0,1008 -0,0079 0,1606 0,1755 0,1629 
The negative sign of EXCRES_RES is somewhat complex as mentioned before. Perhaps this is a 
consequence of banks’ willingness to hold excess reserves at different stages of the lending cycle. 
In other words, it may be that banks prefer to hold excess reserves when losses are expected, i.e. 
when the risk level rises and banks apply more cautious lending standards. In turn, this leads to 
less bank lending. The multivariate Granger causality test in table 6.14 supports this theory since 
NPLTOTLOANS significantly causes EXCRES_RES. Stauffert (2000) claims that banks can 
circumvent reserve requirements by moving money in and out of different types of deposit 
accounts. In that way the reserve requirements on transaction accounts are met.56 Therefore it 
can be disputed how important reserve requirements really are. EXCRES_RES also significantly 
causes the FEDFUNDSRATE. As the Federal Reserve supplies the banking system with 
more/less liquidity in order to decrease/increase the interest rate this sounds reasonable. A 
bivariate causation between FEDFUNDSRATE and NPLTOTLOANS also seems to exist. It 
                                                 
56
 Stauffert R. (2000), pp. 565-571  
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may not be surprising that higher interest rates make some borrowers unable to amortize their 
loans resulting in a higher nonperforming loans ratio, but what about the opposite causation? 
Does the Federal Reserve really monitor the nonperforming loans ratio when making interest rate 
decisions? This is of course possible but perhaps it is more likely that the NPLTOTLOANS is a 
good indicator of future economic growth, as Wu, Chang and Selvili (2003) have found, which in 
turn may be targeted by the Federal Reserve.57  
The results are much in line with prior research in this field with the exception of excess reserves. 
Therefore, this negative correlation may need further detailed studies in order to fully understand 
the banking system. In this study it has been assumed that some of the variables affect the 
demand of bank loans whereas others affect the supply. This assumption could be challenged. As 
an example, the interest rate is very often described as a demand variable. In spite of this, banks 
carefully look at the interest rate when deciding if a household is capable of repaying a loan in 
order to either grant or deny a loan application.58 Therefore the interest rate could also be a 
supply variable.  
 
6.4 Analysis of banks’ portfolio choice  
Bliss and Kaufman (2002) suggest that banks often have self-imposed minimum levels for capital, 
typically scaled by their riskiness.59 This could mean that banks prefer to lend more to sectors that 
are perceived to be less risky than others as they require less capital. This may also be optimal in 
order to minimize losses and thereby maximize profit.  
In diagram 6.6 the relative year-on-year growth rate of real estate loans to total loans and leases is 
displayed together with the ratio of the delinquency rate of real estate loans to the delinquency 
rate of total loans and leases. The delinquency rate is used as a proxy for the nonperforming 
loans ratio, which is not released sector wise, and describes the risk level of a certain type of 
loans. In the diagram it can be seen that relative growth rate is higher when the ratio of 
delinquency rates is lower and vice versa.  
 
                                                 
57
 Wu W-C., Chang C-O. and Selvili Z. (2003), pp. 43-62 
58
 Meeting with Lars-Gunnar Hermansson, Credit Manager at Nordea, 2010-01-19 
59
 Bliss R. and Kaufman G. (2002), pp. 1-15 
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Diagram 6.6  Relative growth rate of loans and the ratio of delinquency rates  
 
Source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
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described in the data chapter have been used The correlogram below (diagram 6.7) tells us that 
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quarters also leads to a higher ratio of delinquency rate. However, both correlations are quite low.  
Diagram 6.7  Correlogram 
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correlation in the correlogram. Consequently it seems like banks allocate bank loans to different 
sectors depending negatively on their corresponding risk level.  
Table 6.16   Granger causality, BIC maximum 4 lags 
 BIC lags/df Chi-sq Prob. 
RELGR_LOANS → RELGR_DELRT -4,3441 1 2,1964 0,1383 
RELGR_DELRT → RELGR_LOANS -6,2654 2 7,9856 0,0184 
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7 Conclusion  
The purpose of this thesis is to examine which factors that affect bank lending in the United 
States. The choice of variables was made in conformity with theories and previous studies related 
to the field of bank lending. Variables such as the interest rate, the nonperforming loans ratio and 
the capital to asset ratio were used. The data series span over the time period 1988Q1-2009Q3.  
The methods applied to attain the results consist of general-to-specific regression models, 
Granger causality tests, correlograms and Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. Also the relative 
importance of the explanatory variables was calculated as contribution to R2.  
The results of the study provide empirical evidence that the most important variable in explaining 
the variation in bank lending is the nonperforming loans ratio followed by the interest rate, 
excess reserves to total reserves and house prices respectively. However, the negative correlation 
between bank lending and excess reserves to total reserves appears somewhat puzzling. Judging 
by the dummy variables, there is also a seasonal pattern in bank lending. The explanatory 
variables used in this thesis explain between 57 and 79 percent of the variation in bank lending 
depending on which regression model one prefers. Moreover, it is shown that banks allocate 
loans to loan categories that are less risky than the average bank loan.  
 
7.1 Reflections and policy implications  
It could be of great interest to ensure that the banking system is well-functioning and that bank 
lending works frictionless. Just imagine what would happen if no entrepreneur received credit in 
order to fund his/her new capital investments. Certainly much less investment would be made 
resulting in slower economic growth. Economic growth theories generally accentuate the 
importance of capital accumulation for economic growth. It is therefore vital that entrepreneurs 
get access to credit. Of course capital investments can be funded by issuing corporate bonds that 
are sold to e.g. the private sector. However, in that case purchasing power is transferred from the 
private sector to capital investments. In the case of bank lending, or banks purchasing corporate 
bonds, banks can create purchasing power that did not exist before, i.e. banks can create new 
money.  
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The empirical results of this study indicate that the most important factor behind bank lending is 
the nonperforming loans ratio followed by the interest rate (federal funds rate), excess reserves 
and house prices. Central banks can stimulate the economy by lowering interest rates, which is 
their primary weapon. The nonperforming loans ratio, on the other hand, is more rarely 
discussed. Should central banks or governments give this factor more attention as dropping the 
interest rate alone may not be sufficient to stimulate lending? At present the nonperforming loans 
ratio is very high by a historical comparison.60 This is a strong reason for banks to remain risk-
averse. A government could of course buy troubled or nonperforming assets but in the long run 
this may be very costly for the tax payers. A solution to this is to let the central bank create credit, 
by extending its balance sheet, and purchase troubled assets. In this way tax payers would not 
have to pay for the purchases. This solution has been suggested by Werner (2005). 61 On the 
other hand, if reducing the nonperforming loans ratio becomes a regularly used policy tool it 
could create a moral hazard problem. Why would banks apply cautious lending policies if they 
know that a central bank or government will take care of “bad loans” as they arise? Therefore 
this tool may be effective only in extreme situations.  
Another implication of the results in this thesis is that lower interest rates may stimulate lending 
only to some sectors. If we assume that the perceived risk level of real estate loans is lower than 
for example the risk level of loans to corporations for capital investment purposes, lending to real 
estate may grow at the expense of less lending to capital investments. A possible objection to this 
is that higher risk levels of some sectors could reflect that they are in economic trouble and 
thereby also be less willing to borrow from banks. In that case the problem is not a supply 
problem but a demand problem which banks are not responsible for. More research is therefore 
needed to separate the demand and the supply forces of bank loans.  
Reserve requirements may not be a very efficient way to control bank lending, at least not in the 
prevailing system. Firstly, the ratio of excess reserves to total reserves had a negative correlation 
with bank lending in this study perhaps indicating that banks prefer to hold excess reserves when 
losses are expected. Secondly, the Federal Reserve itself and some authors, e.g. Goodhart (1989), 
claim that reserves are supplied to accommodate demand in the banking sector. In this view 
reserve requirements do not constrain bank lending.62 Lastly, Stauffert (2000) points out that 
                                                 
60
 http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/NPTLTL?cid=93, Accessed 2010-01-24  
61
 Werner R. (2005), pp. 1-341 
62
 Goodhart C. (1989), pp. 29-34  
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banks can circumvent reserve requirements by moving money in and out of different types of 
deposit accounts so that the reserve requirements on transaction accounts are met. 63 In addition, 
Bennett and Peristiani (2002) conclude that banks use inventory optimization methods to manage 
reserves instead of complying with a quantitative regulatory minimum. Thereby reserve 
requirements are losing relevance.64 However, many countries do not have any reserve 
requirements at present.  
 
7.2 Suggestions for further research  
As a negative correlation between bank lending and excess reserves to total reserves was found 
further research may be needed. In this study it was suggested that banks prefer to hold excess 
reserves at some stages in the lending cycle when for example future losses are expected. This 
feature could possibly explain the negative correlation.  
The question of whether the availability of credit to entrepreneurs affects the long-run growth 
rate of GDP is another area of research that needs to be illuminated. For example, does a low 
risk level of real estate loans relative to the average risk level of loans result in less availability of 
loans to entrepreneurs, as they may be perceived as riskier? In other words, do some loans grow 
at the expense of others when banks make their portfolio choices? In many countries, e.g. 
Sweden, credit controls were used prior to financial deregulation. These were argued to ensure 
that credit was allocated for purposes considered important for society such as capital 
investment.65 Was this a more effective way to stimulate high long-run economic growth? 
Perhaps these questions can be answered if more research is carried out in the future.   
                                                 
63
 Stauffert R. (2000), pp. 565-571  
64
 Bennett P. and Peristiani S. (2002), pp. 1-16  
65
 Schön L. (2007), pp. 402-407  
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9 Appendix  
Table 9.1   Regression 2  
General-to-specific, 0,05 significance level, lags of explanatory variables: 1-6 
Dependent Variable: LOANSLEASESNSA    
Sample (adjusted): 1989Q2 2009Q3     
Included observations: 82 after adjustments    
      
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. Contribution 
R2 
S2 0,0159 0,0028 5,7690 0,0000  
S3 0,0102 0,0026 3,8960 0,0002  
S4 0,0185 0,0028 6,5945 0,0000  
C 0,0105 0,0029 3,6078 0,0006  
AVPRICEHOUSES(-1) 0,0811 0,0402 2,0181 0,0475 0,0012 
AVPRICEHOUSES(-2) 0,1865 0,0401 4,6472 0,0000 0,1377 
AVPRICEHOUSES(-3) 0,1059 0,0396 2,6743 0,0094 0,0537 
EXCRES_RES(-1) -0,0079 0,0020 -3,8908 0,0002 0,1093 
EXCRES_RES(-3) -0,0051 0,0023 -2,1776 0,0329 0,0265 
FEDFUNDSRATE(-1) 0,0044 0,0013 3,4727 0,0009 0,0702 
FEDFUNDSRATE(-4) -0,0062 0,0012 -5,0761 0,0000 0,2159 
NPLTOTLOANS(-2) -0,0339 0,0162 -2,0881 0,0405 0,1848 
NPLTOTLOANS(-4) 0,1361 0,0313 4,3444 0,0000 -0,3180 
NPLTOTLOANS(-5) -0,1209 0,0255 -4,7361 0,0000 0,1253 
      
R-squared 0,7858      Mean dependent var 0,0156 
Adjusted R-squared 0,7449      S.D. dependent var 0,0155 
S.E. of regression 0,0078      Akaike info criterion -6,7043 
Sum squared resid 0,0042      Schwarz criterion -6,2934 
Log likelihood 288,8744      Hannan-Quinn criter. -6,5393 
F-statistic 19,1921      Durbin-Watson stat 2,0960 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000     
 
 
  
Table 9.2   Diagnostic tests of regression 2 
RESET test - 2 fitted items F-statistic 0,8818     Prob.  0,4189 
Normality test Jarque-Bera 3,2295     Prob.  0,1989 
Breusch-Godfrey - 4 lags F-statistic 0,2348     Prob.  0,9178 
Breusch-Pagan F-statistic 0,5227     Prob.  0,9028 
Ljung-Box/ARCH test - 4 lags Q-stat 2,0826     Prob.  0,7210 
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Table 9.3   Regression 3  
General-to-specific, 0,05 significance level, lags of explanatory variables: 1-6, NPLTOTLOANS preselected 
Dependent Variable: LOANSLEASESNSA      
Sample (adjusted): 1988Q4 2009Q3      
Included observations: 84 after adjustments      
      
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.* Contribution 
R2 
S2 0,0075 0,0031 2,4013 0,0188  
S3 0,0058 0,0031 1,8878 0,0630  
S4 0,0115 0,0030 3,7792 0,0003  
C 0,0138 0,0031 4,4290 0,0000  
AVPRICEHOUSES(-2) 0,1322 0,0409 3,2334 0,0018 0,0948 
AVPRICEHOUSES(-3) 0,1491 0,0423 3,5228 0,0007 0,0776 
EXCRES_RES(-2) -0,0081 0,0024 -3,4357 0,0010 0,1159 
FEDFUNDSRATE(-1) 0,0054 0,0020 2,7105 0,0083 0,0860 
FEDFUNDSRATE(-2) -0,0069 0,0019 -3,5792 0,0006 0,0346 
NPLTOTLOANS(-1) -0,0252 0,0073 -3,4650 0,0009 0,1606 
      
R-squared 0,6780      Mean dependent var 0,0156 
Adjusted R-squared 0,6388      S.D. dependent var 0,0154 
S.E. of regression 0,0092      Akaike info criterion -6,4211 
Sum squared resid 0,0063      Schwarz criterion -6,1317 
Log likelihood 279,6852      Hannan-Quinn criter. -6,3047 
F-statistic 17,3115      Durbin-Watson stat 2,2773 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000     
 
Table 9.5   Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) – regression 3 
 R2 VIF 
AVPRICEHOUSES(-2) 0,2292 1,2974 
AVPRICEHOUSES(-3) 0,2084 1,2633 
EXCRES_RES(-2) 0,2434 1,3218 
FEDFUNDSRATE(-1) 0,9505 20,2139 
FEDFUNDSRATE(-2) 0,9453 18,2702 
NPLTOTLOANS(-1) 0,4845 1,9398 
 
Table 9.4   Diagnostic tests of regression 3 
RESET test - 2 fitted items F-statistic 0,8481     Prob.  0,4325 
Normality test Jarque-Bera 1,2401     Prob.  0,5379 
Breusch-Godfrey - 4 lags F-statistic 0,8314     Prob.  0,5097 
Breusch-Pagan F-statistic 0,6587     Prob.  0,7432 
Ljung-Box/ARCH test - 4 lags Q-stat 1,8892     Prob.  0,7560 
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Table 9.6   Regression 5  
General-to-specific, 0,05 significance level, lags of explanatory variables: only preselected 
Dependent Variable: LOANSLEASESNSA  
Sample (adjusted): 1989Q3 2009Q3  
Included observations: 81 after adjustments 
      
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.* Contribution 
R2 
S2 0,0086 0,0035 2,4856 0,0152  
S3 0,0100 0,0033 3,0276 0,0034  
S4 0,0144 0,0034 4,2624 0,0001  
C 0,0164 0,0036 4,5719 0,0000  
AVPRICEHOUSES(-2) 0,1015 0,0450 2,2536 0,0272 0,0756 
EXCRES_RES(-2) -0,0072 0,0026 -2,7900 0,0067 0,1039 
FEDFUNDSRATE(-6) -0,0022 0,0006 -3,8698 0,0002 0,1156 
NPLTOTLOANS(-1) -0,0255 0,0067 -3,7906 0,0003 0,1629 
      
R-squared 0,5953      Mean dependent var 0,0155 
Adjusted R-squared 0,5565      S.D. dependent var 0,0156 
S.E. of regression 0,0104      Akaike info criterion -6,2015 
Sum squared resid 0,0079      Schwarz criterion -5,9650 
Log likelihood 259,1614      Hannan-Quinn criter. -6,1066 
F-statistic 15,3411      Durbin-Watson stat 2,0720 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000     
 
  
Table 9.7   Diagnostic tests of regression 5 
RESET test - 2 fitted items F-statistic 2,0504     Prob.  0,1362 
Normality test Jarque-Bera 1,5580     Prob.  0,4589 
Breusch-Godfrey - 4 lags F-statistic 1,2265     Prob.  0,3077 
Breusch-Pagan F-statistic 0,6220     Prob.  0,7361 
Ljung-Box/ARCH test - 4 lags Q-stat 2,0606     Prob.  0,7250 
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Diagram 9.1  Variables used in the study  
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Diagram 9.2  Variables used in the study  
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